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Summary  findings
Development  practitioners  are coming to a consensus  Isham,  Narayan,  and Pritchett show methodologically
that participation  by the intended  beneficiaries  improves  how to answer  each of these objections.  Subicctivity  does
project  performance. But is there convincing  evidence  not preclude reliable  cardinal measurement.  Halo effects
that this is true? Skeptics  hay..  three objections:  do not appear to induce a strong upward bias in
* 'Participation" is not objective:  project  rankings are  estimating  the effect of participation.  Finally,
subjective.  instrumental  variables  estimation  can help establish  a
-*  This subjectivity  leads  to "halo effects."  structural  cause and effect relationship  between
* Better  project performance  may have increased  participation  and project performance  - at least in the
beneficiary  participation rather than the other way  rural water supply projects  they studied.
around; a statistical  association  is not proof of cause and
effect.
This paper - a product of the Office  of the Vice  President,  Development  Economics  - is one in a series of background
papers prepared for World  Development  Report 1994 on infrastructure.  Copies  of this paper are available  free from the
World Bank,  1818 H StreetNW, Washington  DC 20433. Please  contact Michael  Geller, room T7-079, extension  31393
(38 pages)-  September 1994.
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Development  practitioners  are corhing  to a consensus  that participation  by the
intended beneficiaries  improves  project performznce. Championed  since the early 1970s  by
mostly  non-economic  social  scientists  and grassroots  organizations  (e.g. Freiere 1973,  Korten
1980),  participatory  development  is increasingly  advocated  by the largest  and most influential
aid agencies (UNDP 1993, World Bank 1991).  However, the existence  of consensus  (or
advocacy)  does not imply the existence of  clear and convincing evidence.  Participation
advocates  have  most often  relied  on case studies  to document  the link  between  participation  and
performance  (e.g. Briscoe  and  Ferranti  1988,  Korten  and Siy 1989). However  these  case  studies
are easily dismissed  by skeptics  as inconclusive,  as the small number of cases and informal
method do not allow formal testing of the findings.  In response, some studies used the
systematic  case study  method  to establish  statistically  the relationship  between  participation  and
project  performance  (Esman  and Uphoff 1984,  Finsterbusch  and Van Wickdin  m 1987).
Skeptics  have raised three objections  to the evidence for a causal impact of
pardcipation  on project performance  from this type of study.  First, *participation'  is not
objective:  hence project rankdngs  are subjective  and not appropriate  for statistical  analysis.
Second,  the subjectivity  in the ranking  of projects  will lead  to 'halo effects':  if investigators
believe  participation  is good, their subjective  ranldngs  will overstate  the level of participation
in highly successful  projects  and the level of success  of highly  partcipatory  projects. Third,2
better project  performance  may  cause increased  beneficiary  participation  rather  than vice  versa:
a mere  statistical  association  is not evidence  of a causal  impact  of partcipation  on performance.
After a brief review  of the construction  of the data on project  performance  and
beneficiary  participation  from 121 runl  water supply  projects  and a presentation  of the basic
statistical  results we address, and overcome, each of these three objections. The subjective
nature of the data does not preclude  inter-subjectively  valid, cardinal  measures  of participation
appropriate  for statistical  analysis. There is no necessary  connection  between  objectivity  and
quantification  with cardinal  numbers:  cardinal  measurement  using  subjective  criteria  is common.
Moreover, the cardinal  rankings  for each  project were created  by two different  coders  and the
degree  of inter-coder  agreement  is very high. Thjs indicates  that inter-subjective  reliability  can
be achieved  even  for intrinsically  subjective  concepts  like "participation." Finally,  we show  that
assuming  cardinality  or imposing  linearity  is not necessary  to establish  the basic  result.
The "halo effect" in coding performance  and participation  data from project
documents  is addressed  in two ways. Flrst, we show  the results  are the same  if the  first coder's
performance  indicators  are regressed  on the second  coder's participation  scores  (and  vice  versa),
which  indicates  a lack  of a subjective  halo effect by the coders. However,  the primary  danger
of subjective  measurement,  and one that we cannot address,  is that the same individual  who
assessed  project success  also assessed  participation. If that person  has strong  views about the
relationship  this may induce  a bias in the project documents  themselves,  as the performance  of
participatory  projects  (and the participation  in successful  projects)  may be exaggerated.
We do however  show that the strength  of the performance-participation  relationship  does not
depend  on the 'objectiveness"  of the success  indicator.3
The tiird  objection, and the most difficult objection to answer, is  that the
existence  of an association  does not imply  causation. While causality  is nearly impossible  to
establish,  we present  three arguments. First, we use instrumental  variables  estimation  which
allows  the identification  of the impact of exogenous  changes  in participation,  eliminating  the
effect on the participation  estimates  of reverse  causation  or simultaneity. Second,  data on the
timing  of participation  shows  that participation  at early stages improves  project  performance  at
every stage, from implementation  to maintenance. Third, we describe  case studies  in which
exogenous  changes  in participation  in ongoing  projects  had strong  impacts  on performance.
Even  for this  limited  set of projects..  this paper  is not intended  as a comprehensive
account. We focus  on a narrow  set of econometic  issues  involved  in drawing  inferences  from
project data.  Narayan  (1994),  drawing  on these data  and more, discusses  in more detail the
relationship  between  performance  and participation,  the determinants  of project  success  besides
participation, the detenninants  of participation,  and the mechanisms  whereby participation
increases  overall  effectiveness.
1) Data on rural water projects  and basic results
The systematic  case review method (Finsterbusch  1990)  is used to transform
varied, qualitative  evaluations  of a set of related phenomena  into data suitable  for statistical
evaluation. To illustrate  this approach,  consider  a hypothetical  study  of effectiveness  in higher
education. A researcher  wants to use statistical  techniques  to determine  the most important
factors that contribute  to undergraduate  leaming.  She does  not have the time or resources  to
design and implement  a new survey, but does have access to myriad evaluations  by other4
agencies--in  our hypothetical  example, evaluations  of 100 American  universities,  drawn from
six different  education  organizations. A set of variables  to be tested are then defined--e.g.,
quality  of the faculty,  research  facilities--and  given  a simple  numerical  scale. Two  independent
coders then read the different evaluations  and, based on their subjective  analysis of that
information,  code  the level of each  variable. The coder  generates  this numeric  score  based  upon
quantitative -nd  qualitative  analysis  in the original  report.  The final set of data, usually  the
average  of the two coder's evaluations,  is then used for statistical  analysis.
The statistical  data of the 121 rural water supply  projects  in this study were
assembled  from project  documents  using the systematic  case review method'. Ex-post  project
assessments  by development  agencies  typically  combine limited  quantitative  evaluations  with
subjectve judgements of project performance.  Each project document  was read by two
independent  readers. From this information,  these  two readers  coded  specific  project  variables
(e.g., oveal  success  of project)  onto a scale from I to 7, creating 144  distinct  variables.
Appendix  Table 1.1 shows the list of coded variables  (along with the basic
summary statistcs).  These can be divided into four groups:
project performance indicators (e.g.  "overall project effectiveness",
"percent  of water system  in good condition');
e  measures of  participation (e.g.  'overall  beneficiary participation",
"participation in construction");
'Finsterbusch and  Van  Wicldin  m (1987)  used  the systematic  case  review  approach  for their study
of USAID  projects. While  Esman  and  Uphoff  (1979)  did  not exactly  follow  this methodology,  their basic
approach  was similar:  converting  independent  project  evaluations  to a numercal  scale.5
*  background  or project  characteristics  which  determine  project  performance
(e.g. "size  of project",  "availability of spare parts');
*  background  or project characteristics  which  determine  participation  (e.g.
"extent  to which agency  made participation  a goal", "consensus  among
users").
The "participation"  variable  merits  some  discussion.  The  measure  of participation
was not simply a  measure of  whether potential beneficiaries  were surveyed  about their
preferences.  Participation  was scored on a continuum,  ranging from information  sharing,
consultation, shared decision-maldng  to  control over decision-maldng. Participation  of
beneficiaries  was considered  at three different stages of the project  cycle: in project design,
construction,  and operation  and maintenance.
1) Basic model  and results
We begin with the most general indicators-overall  pmject effectiveness  (OPE)
and overall  beneficiary  participation  (OBP)-and  specify  and estimate  a simple  linear  relationship
between  performance  and participation. The bivariate  relationship  between  OPE  and OBP is
simply:6
1)  OPE=  *OBP + e
which  is functionally  equivalent  to the simple  correlation  of the two variables 2.
The usefulness  of this  bivariate  relationship  is  limited  since  other  non-participation
determinants  of project  performance  are excluded. In expanding  the model,  it proves  useful to
divide non-participation  determinants  into two groups: those that are fully exogenous  and not
affected by participation (e.g. 'availability  of spare parts") denoted by a matrix Z and those
which  are potentially  affected  by participation  (e.g. 'responsiveness  of managers")  denoted  by
the matrix W.  The multivariate  equations are then:
2)  OPE.=  OBP,  + 8  *  Z. + 8w * Wj +  eC2
3)  W  =y  *  OBP  +  y  *  Z, +  y  * X,.+,
Both Z's and W's are potential  determinants  of project performance,  however  Z's  represent
variables  that are not influenced  by participation,  while W's represent  variables  which may be
deteriined (in part) by participation. As indicated  in the second  equation,  W's may also be
21n  the bivariate  linear  regression  the  regression  coefficient  is  - (where  a,  is the covariance
of y and x) where the correlation  coefficient  p  is  . So, the correlation  coefficient
p  =,B  *(-A)  is a simple  rescaing of the bivariate  linear  regression  coefficient.
aJ7
determined  in part by the Z's and by some  other set of variables,  X's (the non-participation
determinants  of the W's).  In summary,  these multivariate  equations  state that  performance  of
a  water project depends on: beneficiary  participation;  a  set of inputs (Z) not related to
participation (e.g., "adequacy  of facilities", "availability of spare parts"); a set of performance
determinants  (W) that may in turn be determined  by partcipation (e.g., "responsiveness  of
managers",  appropriateness  of technology)  as well as by other inputs.
The distinction  between  the Z's and the W's is important  for maintaining  the
distinction  between  the partial  and the total impact  of participation  on project  performance. In
the multivariate  regression  (equation  2), the beta coefficient  gives  the direct  impact  of increasing
participation,  holding  all included  variables  constant:
4)  a0PE1 =z
aOBP  4Z%w 
But participation  may also influence  performanace  indirectly: the total impact of changing
participation  is the sum of the direct and indirect  impacts:
5)  dOPE  =8OPE1 +  8OPE *  aw
dOBP  aOBP  aW  8FBP
or in this particular  specification,
6)  dOPE  +  *y
dOBP- 8
Thus, the simple  partial  coefficient  with  all controls  understates  the total  impact  of participation
while the bivariate  coefficient  (which  excludes  thie  Z's and W's) overstates  the impact to the
extent these determinants  and participation  are positively  correlated. For each regression  we
report the linear regression  coefficient  on OBP in the OPE for regression  for each of the three
specifications.
Table 1 presents  three estimates  of the linear association  of overall beneficiary
participation  (OBP)  with  overall  project  effectiveness  (OPE):  bivariate;  limited  multivariate  (with
Z's); and full multivariate  (with  Z's and W's).  In all cases the results  are strongly  statistically
significant  and empirically  quite large. The t-statistics  range from 10.6  in the bivariate  case to
3.8 with the full multivariate  controls.
The estimated  impact  of participation  on project  effectiveness  ranges  from .62 for
the  bivariate case to  .24 in  the full multivariate case 3. How are  these coefficients to be
interpreted?  The expected  impact  of increasing  participation  from  a low level  (OBP=2)  to a high
level (OBP=6) is to improve  project  performance  from between  1 to 2.5 points (on a seven
point scale). A one standard  deviation  increase  in participation  (s.d.=1.7, Appendix  table 1.1)
is  associated  with between a  .41 (full multivariate)  to  1.05 (bivariate)  point increase in
performance. The interesting-and  intuitively  appealing-results  of the all regressions  (limited
and full multivariate)  are reported  in Appendix  table 1.2 and are discussed  in Narayan  (1994).
The multivariate  impact  is naturally  lower  than  the bivariate  effect  due  to the exclusion  of positively
correlated  non-participation  performance  determinants,  as discussed  above. Since  the bivariate  effect  is
a biased  upward  estimate  of the  total effect  and the full multivariate  estimate  of the partial  effect  is likely
biased downward  for the total effect,  these  create  reasonable  bounds  for the total  effect.9
Table 1: Basic results  for participation  (OBP)  with
OPE (Overall  Project  Effectiveness)  as the dependent  variable
Bivariate  Limited  multivariatea  (Z  Full multivariate  (Z and
variables)  W variables)
on OBP  0.62  0.28  0.24
t-stat.  10.6  5.3  3.8
N  121  77  68
R2 0.49  0.86  0.89
Notes: a)  Regression  results  for other  vauiables  reported  in Appendix  table  2.1.
We note here that the choosing  of the Z's and W's in this study  was not entirely
straightforward  nor rules-driven. However,  all the results have  proved  robust  to a number  of
variations of the model, and we feel that the choice of control variables  is not of primary
interes'.  We were generous  in our inclusion  of potential  performance  factors,  including 18
non-participation  variables. The participation  variable thus easily passes  this "kdtchen  sink'
torture test of throwing all plausible variables into the regression.  The danger of inadequate
controls  for other  determinants  of project  performance  is not nearly  as serious  a problem  as the
three we discuss  below'.
I  We do, after all, face the difficulty of 144 coded variables with only 121 projects, which means
that mechanical procedures  for selecting variables will lack degrees of freedom and are unlikely to be of
much help.  Moreover, many of the variables are clearly overlapping and likely to be collinear.  After
some experimentation, we based variable inclusion  on three criterion: decent inter-coder  reliability, prior
judgements about the best of collinear sets of variables, and impact on the estimate  of participation (we
never dropped any variable which seriously affected  the estimate of the participation  coefficient). In none
of the experiments were the results on participation  substantially  different from the full multivariate case
reported in table 1.
5  Heteroskedasticity, a  typical econometric problem which receives a fair bit of attention (one
suspects because it is easy to fix) deserves slight mehtion here.  It is not a problem with the present
results for two reasons.  First, the White heteroskedasticity  consistent standard errors are roughly the10
II) Subjective  cardinal  data
The first objection  to studies--and  results-of this Idnd  is that the data generated
by the systematic  case review  method  are subjective. According  to this skeptical  view subjective
data is unreliable  and/or ordinal  and therefore  inappropriate  for statistical  analysis.  In this
section  we show our data are subjective,  yet reliable and cardinal.  First, we argue that the
automatic  association  of subjective  phenomena  with ordinal  data  is incorrect. Second,  the  degree
of  inter-coder  agreement  on the scoring of the major variables  reveals that the subjective
measurement  error, while present,  was a r.inor source of variation. Third, using techniques
appropriate  for ordinal  data do not dramatically  change  the results,  and the constraints  imposed
by linear regression  analysis  are also not rejected  by the data.
Subjective  and objective.  ordinal  and cardinal
Economic  theory  presumes  that objective  phenomena  (e.g. numbers  of oranges,
relatve prices)  have  a natral cardinal  metric  (e.g. real numbers)  whereas  intrinsically  subjective
phenomena  (e.g. consumer  utility) allow only ordinal comparisons  (e.g. better or  worse)
especially  intersubjectively'.  This distinction  is critical. While  both cardinal  and ordinal  data
same  as the OLS: the t-statistics  with White are 11.4 vs 10.6 (bivariate)  and 5.33 vs. 5.25 (full
multivariate). Second, in scoring  variables, each co>der  recorded  their subjective  assessment  of the
reliability  of the score  assigned. When  these  reliability  measures  were  used  to weight  observations,  the
results were roughly the same.  And when, because of a programming  mistake,  we weighted  the
observations  by giving  more  weight  to the less  reliable  observations,  the coefficient  point  estimates  were
still the roughly  the same. This  is perversely  reassuring:  under  the assumptions  for consistency  of OLS,
weighted  least squares estimation  is also consistent  kor any set of weights,  even the exactly  wrong
weights.
eOrdinality  stems  directly  from  the basic  theory  of mapping  a binary  preference  relation  into a utility
index. The restrictions  imposed  on the preference  relation  (complete,  reflexive,  transitive)  imply  that
once  a given  utility index  is derived  any monotone  transform  of that index  equally  well represents  the11
can rank phenomena,  only with cardinal data can numbers be tabulated  and values of the
phenomena  being measured  be compared  directly.  Most common  statistical  techniques  Oike
correlations  or linear regression)  cannot  be applied  to ordinal  data 7.
However,  the data used in this analysis  created by the systematic  case review
method  are subjective,  yet cardinal. Our data on rural water projects  is doubly  subjective:  the
original  project  evaluator  subjectively  assessed  and described  the amount  of participation  in each
project;  a coder  later  read the evaluator's  report  and subjectively  assigned  a level  of participation
to that project. If this process  generated  ordinal  data, empirical  analysis  would  be difficult. But
note that in everyday  life, we observe  many events  which generate  subjective,  cardinal  data.
Contests  are the most obvious  example. When  hogs, figure skaters,  or bodybuilders  compete
judges assign cardinal scores to subjective  criteria: 'quality of coat" for hogs; 'artistic
impression"  for figure skaters;  and 'muscle tone" for body builders.  Grades for acadeniic
papers  are another  familiar  example:  a professor's subjective  evaluation  of a humanities  paper
is given a cardinal  score. In each case,  these subjectively  assigned  scores  are added,  averaged,
tabulated  in ways only  appropriate  to cardinal  data. Of course,  the  judging  and grading  criteria
same  preferences.
7  For instance  is x were an ordinal measure  of participation  then estimating  the linear model
y=p *x  could  produce  different  results  than estimating y=P  *(x)  ,  JO  a monotone  transform  of
x, even  though  x and  Ax)  would  represent  exactly  the same  information Therefore  any statistical
procedure  that relied on summing  observations  (or any comparison  of the magnitude  of the distance
between  observation)  would  be invalid  for ordinal  data.12
are created to achieve  inter-subjective  consensus'.  Thus, the question for this data set on
characteristics of water projects is  not whether the data is  subjective, but whether the
subjectively  cardinal  scores  are reliable.
Inter-subjective  agreement
Since  project  variables  were scored  from the same  documents  by two  independent
coders, the coherence  of their  separate  scores  illuminates  the overall  reliability  of the variables.
Table  2 presents  two measures  of the cross  coder agreement.  The correlations  for the two major
variables  (column  1) are strikingly  high: over .99. The average  absolute  value  of the difference
in the scores  (column  2) is quite small: most scores  either  agree or differ  by just 1 point. For
each of the two major  variables,  the coders  disagreed  by 2 or more points  on only one projecL
Table 2:  Cross coder reiablity
Correlation  between  coder  Average  absolute  difference
A and B  of scores (1 to 7 scale)
Overall  project  effectiveness  .95  .36
Overall  beneficiary  92  .55
participation  I  I
This high degree  of inter-subjective  consensus  has two important  implications.
It creates  a prima facie  case that the characteristics  of the project  could  be reliably  gauged  from
the project documents. The high correlation  also places a  relatively tight bound on tihe
This does mean  that  judging  requires  training  to achieve  this level of inter-subjective  agreement.
For instance,  there are contests  for the judges in which  those  trining to be livestock  contest  judges  are
themselves  judged  on the degree  to which  their subjective  judgements  conform  to those  of established
judges (Herren, 1984).
'  The reliability  was much  less  for some  other variables  in the data set13
magnitude of measurement error:  a correlation coefficient of  .9 implies that the noise from
measurement error is roughly 10 percent of the variance of the observed variable.' 0
Testing linearity or cardinality
We examine the implications of cardinality in two ways.  We treat the data as if
it were ordinal, using dummy variables for each participation category.  We also test linearity
of the relationship-which imposes even stronger conditions than cardinality.  Of course, these
techniques do not 'prove'  cardinality of the data; but they both show that the basic results on
beneficiary participation are not affected either by allowing for the possibility that the data are
ordinal or by our functional form assumptions.
A first procedure treats both the performance and the participation data as ordinal.
For both prcject performance and participation, a binary variable takes a value of 1 if the score
is high (>  3.5) and 0 otierwise.  This procedure is valid even if the data were ordinal; binary
variables would be unaffected by monotone transforms".  The final column of table 3 reports
1D  That is if two observationw  liffer by only measurement  error then  the correlation  between  the two
2
obslvatiis  p  =  a=  Whe  ax.  isihevarianceofthe"true"vaiableaod  OL
Cr|JX  - a-,:AX+
is the measurement error variance for coder A(B).  If both coders measurement  error is equal
2
2  2  2  4
4A =  o,  =  aG  a correlation  of .9 implies  the ratio of measurement  error to true variance  2
a=*
is about .1.
1'  Although  this procedure  is valid if the data are ordinal if the data are in fact cardinal this
procedure  is very inefficient-as  it throws  away  all of the infbrmation  about  variation  within each  of the
two performance  categories.14
the results  of this linear probability  regression' 2. The performance-parcipation  effect remains
evident  with this transformation  of the data.
A second  approach  argues  that if the participation  data were in fact ordinal,  one
would  not expect  to find a linear relationship  between  the two variables:  the 'true'  underlying
ordinal relationship  variables  would not be invariant  with respect to arbitrary  transformations
(e.g., squaring)  of the data.  Table 3 presents  one test of linearity:  allowing  for a slope shift
depending  on the value  of participation. When  participation  is low (< =3.5) the slope  would
be  p1 while when participation  is high (>3.5)  the slope is  p1 +  p2 . Although  the
estimates  do suggest  the incremental  impact  of participation  is larger at higher  levels (slope  of
.466 vs .781), this difference  is not statistically  significant  (a low t-statistic  and a declining
adjusted  R-squared). Increases  in participation  have roughly the same impact  along the range
from low to high participation.
12  We  could  have  used  an estimator  more  efficient  fbr binary  dependent  variables  (such  as logit  or
probit)  but the linear  probability  model  produces  a consistent  estimate  which  is sufficient  for our
purposes.15
Table 3:  Tests of linearity  and functional form
Linear  Linear  with  Binary  Binary  variables
kdnk  variable  for  (both  OPE and
each  OBP  OBP)a
category
Participation  coeff.  .623  .466  .552
(t-statistic)  (10.6)  (3.007)  (7.34)
Change in slope  .315
(OBP>3.5)  (1.33)
OBP< =1.5  2.55
1.5 <  OBP < =2.5  3.06
2.5 < OBP < =3.5  3.59
3.5 < OBP  < =4.5  4.25
4.5<  OBP< =5.5  5.16
5.5<  OBP  5.74
.481  .480  .459  .306b
_ 2
Note: a)  The binary model is estimated  as a linear probability mDdel.  b)  The R-squared  is not comparable
between the linear regressions  and the binary model.
A  third technique  treats participation  as  if  it were ordinal while treating
performance  as cardinal. Each discrete  level of the participation  variable  is entered  into the
performance  equation  as a dummy  variable:  D1=1 if OBP=1, 0 otherwise;  D2=1 if OBP=2;
etc.' 3 This functional  forn imposes  no a priori constraints  on the effect of the independent
variable. The results  in table 3 show  a strong  participation  effect-performance  increases  for
each dummy  variable-without  any strong  indications  that this statistically  unconstrained  fit is
tremendously  superior  to the imposition  of linearity. The incremental  impact  from category  to
D Although  since  the averages  of coders  responses  were used,  the numbers  are not  always  integers
ranges  for the variables  were  specified  to generate  these  dummy  variables.16
category  (from the differences  in the coefficients)  ranges  from .5 to .75, roughly  equivalent  to
the overall linear slope  of .623.
Thus, the subjective  nature of the data per se appears  to have no impact  on the
result: high inter-subjective  reliability  of cardinal  was achieved,  and the results appear to be
broadly  consistent  with a simple  linear model.
m)  Halo effects
A potentially  more  senous problem  than the data's intrinsically  subjective  nature
is that either the initial evaluator  of the projects or the coders themselves  succumbed  to the
plausible assumption  that all good things go together: the whalo  effectu.' 4 The halo effect
occurs when the measurement  of the variables  are affected  by the observed  state of the other
variable. This systematic  measurement  error will  induce  an association  between  two subjectively
measured variables even in the absence of any *true- relationship  between the underlying
variables. In our study, the halo effect may occur at two stages. The evaluators  may have
falsely  attrbuted participation  to successful  projects (or vice versa) or the coders-reading the
project documents  searching  for evidence  of project participation-may  have been affected  by
their simultaneous  assessment  of project success  (despite  their  efforts  to remain  objective). The
This  psychological  tendency  associate  all good  Ihings  go together  has been  discussed  in a number
of fields. In particular,  there  is a large  literature  in the  human  resource  management  about  the halo  effect
problem  in performance  assessments  in which  outstanding  performance  in one  dimension  or characteristic
(even a potentially  irrelevant  characteristic  such as physical attractiveness)  may tend to bias upwards
evaluation  of other  dimensions  or characteristics.  Hammermesh  and  Biddle  (1993)  find that  plain  people
make about  5 percent  less  and attractive  people  five percent  more  than  persons  of average  attractiveness.
However,  for a recent  dissenting  view on the importance  of halo  effects  in perfbrmance  evaluation,  see
Murphy,  Jako, and Anhalt,  1993.17
second  is particularly  dangerous:  in this study  the two  coders  knew  the purpose  of the empirical
exercise  and may have  had some  strong  prior beliefs  as to the expected  outcome.
There is nothing we can do about the potential whalo  effect" of the original
evaluations. We do know  that the project  reports were regular  parts of institutional  evaluation
cycle and that it is doubtful  that the financing  agencies had a particular stake in promoting
participation. It could also be expected  those many different  individuals  writing  the project
documents  would  have  had widely  different  beliefs  about the importance  of participation  so that
a uniform  bias in the first hand assessments  would  be unlikely.
As for the potentially  serious  'halo effect"  in the coding  process,  we  explore  three
avenues  to address  the problem. Note that  the results  in table  2 are based  on the average  of the
two coders assessments. Alternatively,  we estimated  the same models  using  only data from
coder A and from coder B. Differences  in these  two assessments  may reflect  differences  in the
"halo  effect" between  the coders. Second,  in the same models,  we used  coder A's assessment
of the explanatory  variables  (mcluding  OBP)  with  coder  B's assessment  of the dependent  variable
(OPE). Since coder A's assessments  of participation  and the other potential  determinants  are
not affected by coder B's performance  assessment,  this should reduce the halo effect bias
(although  the confounding  effect  of pure measurement  error in the coder's assessments  will be
important). Third, the coders  created  some  project  performance  indicators  that, by their  nature,
are more  objective  than others. If they were present  halo effects  would  be more  likely for the
more subjective  indicators.18
Results by and across coders
Table 4 shows the regression results with the average  values, only the values of
coder A, only the values of coder B (columns  1, 2, and 4 respectively). The differences  in the
both bivariate and multivariate  result are very small.  Table 4 also shows the corresponding
results of the cross-coder  tests: column 3 show A's outputs on B's inputs; column 5 shows  B's
outputs on A's  inputs.  Again the results are stubstantially  the same.  In the bivariate and
multivariate  models  the coefficient  does not systematically  change, whether we use the average
of the coders' scores, each coder's own scores, or one coder's dependent  variable scores on the
other coder's independent  variable scores.
Table 4: Basic results by average coder value, coders A and B respectively;  |
regressing overall project e#ectiveness (OPE)
on overall beneficiary participation (OBP)
OPE on OBP  Averages of  A on A  A on B  B anB  BonA
A and B
Bivariate  0.62  0.60  0.62  0.60  0.57
(10.6)  (10.  1)  (10.3)  (9.7)  (9.3)
N  121  111  116  111  116
R2 0.49  0.49  0.48  0.46  0.43
Full multivariate  0.24  0.23  0.26  0.21  0.25
(3.8)  (2.6)  (2.1)  (2.0)  (2.7)
N  68  37  46  46  37
R2 0.89  0.94  0.85  0.89  0.9419
How reassuring are these cross-coder  results?  Ihe  following  equations are
helpful. Let's say that A's observation  on project  performance  is the "truth"  plus  some  random
noise 0,  plus an upward  bias based on A's observation  of participation:
-7)  OPE  = OPE  +  BA*OBPA  *
Coder A's observation  on participation  is just the "truth" plus random  error:
8)  ORPA  - OBP*+IA
In this case, the coefficient  of regressing  performnnce  on participation  will be biased j  by the
"halo effect". If the true structural  relationship  were:
9)  OPE  =  p*OBP  +  E
the estimated  coefficient  would be:
10)  B+.
so that even  if there were no structural  relationship  between  the "true"  variables  (  p =  o ) the
estimate  of the participation  effect could be spuriously  positive  due to halo effects.
Given this background, why does  having another coder  matter?  If  the
observations-and  scoring-of participation  were completely  objective,  using  a second coder's
data would  have no effect A's and B's observations  on participation  would  be identical  (OBPA
=  OBPJ)  and if the degree  of halo effect was similar  (.BA=  X  , the bias on perfonmance20
data  would  have no effect: A's and B's observations  on participation  would  be identical  (OBPA
=  OBP 3) and if the degree  of halo effect was similar  (8J  - 8  ,the  bias on performance
would be equivalent. If the observations  of participation  are subjecdve,  then the "halo  effect"
bias should be less using cross coder data because the pure sbjective component  of B's
assessment  does  not affective  the bias  in the performance  measure. However,  to the extent  the
performance  is truly subjective  this argues against the inter-subjective  reliability  above and
induces  downward  bias in the estimates  due to classical  measurement  error.
Table 5 shows  Monte Carlo simulations  of the combined  effects  of the "halo
effect" bias and of pure measurement  error, using different assumptions  about the relative
strengths  of the two effects. Unfortunately,  these simulations  show that both underesmation
and overestimation  are possible  when  coders scores  are crossed,  depending  on the ratio of the
two effects.  With large measurement  error (the final column), crossing  the coder rankings
should produce lower estimates  than using the rankings of a single coder for all posstble
strengths  of "halo effect' for inputs  and outputs  with no measurement  error (the  first columns)
and high degrees  of the "halo  effect-, crossing  the coder rankings  does  not help,  it produces  the
same estimates  (with  a similar  upward  bias).
Evidence from the relatively high inter-subjective  reliability (as well as the
instrumental  variable results  below) suggests  low but non-zero  measurement  error,  °  is
from .1 to .25.  In this range of measurement  error (columns  4 and 5), one would  expect  a21
modest  but significant  change  in estimates  when  crossing  coder's OPE  and OBP  ranings if the
"halo  effect' was strong. The lack  of a consistent  downward  movement  of the estimates  (in  the
multivariate  case they actually  rise) suggest  at least that the 'halo effect" is not dominating  the
results.
Table 5:  Results of Monte Carlo simulation of the combined
effects of measurement  error  and "halo  effects" using  cross coder
information.
Degree of measurement error
_0  '  .25  .5
Degree  1  2  3  4  5  6  7
of  AonA  AonB  AonA  AonB  AonA  AonB
EffectH  0  .5  .5  .40  .40  .33  .33
(true)  (true)
.25  .75-  .75  .65  .60  .58  .50
.5  1  1  .90  .80  .83  .67
1  1.5  1.5  1.4  1.2  1.3  1.0
Note: The results  are the average  estimates  from 1,000  replications  of 120
observations  each of the model:
y=, *x + e  f =.5,  x,  E  N(0,1) ,  A(B)'s observations  on the x variable  are
subject to measurement error of the form:  xA>  = x  +  k*qA,  where A(B)
indicates  that A and B have  different  random  measurement  error of proportion  k.
The observations  on the dependent  variable  y are determined  by
yAW) = y  +  6 *xA(m so that the measurement error of A or B influences the
measurement  of y by common  'halo'  factor of  a
Results  by performance  indicator2:;!
A second technique  to evaluate the halo effect is to examine  the impact of
participation  on project  performance  indicators  that vary in their  objectivity.  In addition  to OPE
several more objective  indicators  of project success were coded, including  'percent of water
system  in good  condition," or "percent  of population  target  reached." To the extent that these
more  objective  phenomena  are relatively  less susceptible  to halo overestimation,  the possible  halo
effect bias should  be reduced.
If the true coefficient  were equal  in the two models  (which  is not  clear-see  below),
the more  objective  indicator  should  be systematically  lower than  the upwardly-biased  subjective
indicator.  Table 6 presents these results.  There is no evidence that the more subjective
indicators  (such  of OPE) have systematically  larger estimated  impacts.
Table 6: Impact of participation by various indicators of perfonrance
Overall  Project  Objective  % of Water  % of Target
Effectiveness  Value  of  System  in Good  Populaion
Benefits  Condition  Reached
Bivariate  X
/3  on OBP  0.62  0.53  0.54  0.29
t-statistics  10.6  10.3  6.4  5.3i;
N  121  120  98  118.00
R 2 0.49  0.47  0.29  0.19
Full multivariate
,B  on OBP  0.24  0.27  0.29  0.25
t-statistic  3.8  3.6  2.4  2.50
N  68  68  60  68.00
R2 0.89  0.79  0.77  0.4723
IV)  Joint determination  and Causality
The prior two sections have answered possible skepticism  about the strong
statistical association  between performance  and participation  association. Another line of
skepticism  may  accept  the statistical  association  between  participation  and  performance  but deny
this association  reveals cause and effect.  In this skeptical  view, the data do not show that
greater participation  causes  better project  performance,  simply  that they happen  to be related.
Indeed,  there  are at least  two good reasons  that a performance-participation  association  may not
be causal. First, there could  be "reverse  causation":  projects  that are exogenously  better  might
induce greater beneficiary  participation. This is sensible especially  when performance  and
participation  depend  on a sequence  of actions.  Once it is clear that project is failing, each
potential  beneficiary  may be less likely to participate  because she perceives  a relatively  low
benefit from participation  which is unlikely  to alter the project  outcome.
Second,  joint determination  of project  success  aM  beneficiary  participation  may
be driven by a third local or project attribute. For example, if dynamic  leaders  induce  both
project performance  and participation,  performance  and participation  data will be strongly
associated-even  without  an independent  causal  effect of participation  on performance. While
we have  tried to address  this concern  over spurious  correlation  with  the 'kitchen  sink" inclusion
of possible  performance  determinants,  it would not take a very clever  skeptic  to name a large
list of excluded  variables  (and some unobservable  even in principle)  that could affect both
performance  and participation. We use three approaches  to resolve  the problems  of reverse
causation  andjoint  association  and  demonstrate  a causal  impact:  instrumental  variables  estimation
techniques,  timing, and case studies.24
lnstivmental  variables
One econometric  solution  to the problem of identifying  a structural  relationship
is estimation  with instrumental  variables. Instrumental  variables  estimation  avoids the problem
of the joint determination  of the independent  and dependent  variables  by eliminating  in the
estimation  of the coefficients  that part of the variation  in the independent  variable which is due
to variation  in the dependent  variable. The vehicle  to eliminate  th,at  variation  is a third variable
(the instruments)  which affects  only the independent  variable and not the dependent  variable.
In  order  to do instrumental variables, we need a  variable that does affect
participation  but which does not affect directly, nor is affected  by, performance. This variable
is  used as  our  instrument to purge the participation variable of  any performance-related
component. When the participation  effect is estimated using only the part of  participation
variation that is correlated  with the variation  in the instrument,  the resulting  estimate  is free of
reverse causation:  since better  performance  does not affect the instrument,  the reverse effect  of
better perfonnance on participation  is eliminated  and cannot  bias the results.
Expressed  in equations,  if the model is:
11)  OPE =  *  OBP +  5Z*Z  +  6:W*Wi  +86*Vj+
12)  . O  cc  =  Zj  a|.*Vi  m,  Vi  T+,25
All  V's  which are  included in  the participation equation  (a,,  O'  but excluded from the
performance equation,(  8v=0  ) are  legitimate instruments.  The V's  provide a  source of
variation in participation that is exogenous to performance.  On the other hand, neither the Z's
nor the W's are valid instruments: they directly affect both participation and performance.
To choose appropriate instruments, we need a positive model for partcipation.
Hypotheses based upon the larger study of these water projects (Narayan 1994) (as well as
theoretical literature on the determinants  of participation) generated a set of equations  to estimate
the effects of participation (Appendix table 1.3 shows the ful  "first stage" regressions).  We
identify four variables as legitimate instruments:  "extent to which participation was a project
goal";  "percent of  investment costs bome  by  users";  'beneficiares  overall net  benefits of
participation"; and "extent to which organization is based on local collectives." We hypothesize
each of these phenomena may directly affect participation, but should have no independent,
direct effect on project performance after controlling for participation.
In table 7,  the OLS and IV results are compared-for  both the bivariate and the
limited multivariate case' 5. The estimated impact of participation increases with IV estimates.
For instance, when  extent to which participation was a project goal" is used as an instrument,
the  bivariate impact rises from .63 to  .70; the multivariate rises from .28 to .34.  Similar
results-the  IV producing a higher and statistically significant  estimate-are observed for each of
'5  The full multivariate  case  loses  too many  degrees  of freedom. So  while  the  results  are empirically
similar  they  are less precise.26
the instruments  used singly".  When all instnrments  are used together the impact in the
bivariate  case rises to .86 and to .37 in the limited  multivariate  case.
What do these IV estimates tell us?  The basic statistical  relationship-high
correlation between participation and  performance-would also  occur if  better project
performance  caused  greater  better participation:  as clean water is delivered  in the early stages
of a project, more  potential  beneficiaries  may want to get involved. But if this were the causal
story, the IV technique  would  cause the estimates  to fall by removing  this upward  simultaneity
bias.  The rising coefficients  reported in Table 7 are consistent  with causality  running  from
higher participation  to better  project  performance  in the presence  of some  measurement  error.
The  IV results  allow  us to compute  an independent  estimate  the magnitude  of pure
measurement  error. Even  if the OTLS  estimator  is inconsistent  with measurement  error, the IV
estimator is consistent  and their  ratio estimates  converges to  plim(  PtOL)=  . With
NV  (a+  + 
the reported  estimates,  this  ratio is between  .8 and .9 (e.g. .63/.70 (bivariate)  or .281.36). The
2
ratio of measurement  error to true variance 2!  is between  .11 and .25: this is consistent  with
2
*6 Except for the multivariate  case  when 'organization  based  on local collectives'  is used  where  the
coefficient  drops to .15 and statistical  insignificance  (ikely due to the low power  of the instrument).27
(although somewhat higher than) the estimates of measurement  error from cross coder reliability
correlations in table 2 above.
In using this technique, one would like to test whether the assumptions made in
obtaining the IV results are valid.  Note that since one variable may be endogenous-beneficiary
participation-at  least one instrument must be  used  to  identify the  model 17. But  if  one
instrument can be unambiguously  accepted-that  without argument it directly affects only the
independent variable-then the validity of any other instruments can be tested. Indeed, the entire
set of instruments can be tested.
17  Heuristically  the problem is that we need to test the exclusion  of the instrument  from the
performance  equation. However,  one cannot  test the exclusion  directly  (say  by a t-test  of the inclusion
of the instrument)  because  in the presence  of endogeneity  the coefficient  on the potentially  endogenous
variable  is inconsistent  when  not instrumented  and hence the t-test on the instrument  would  be biased.
As a simple  example  say the model  is  y  = P  *x  +  8 *z + e  and x is endogenous.  Say  there is a
single potential  instrument  z, say  x  =  ,r*z  +xj . But z is a valid instrument  only if  8  = 0
However,  this hypothesis  can onlytbe  tested if there is a consistent  estimate  for  P . But if z is used
as an instrument  for x, then  the 'instrumented"  x is perfectly  collinear  with  z (since  the instrumented  x
is just x projected onto z).  But since the 'instrumented" x is collinear it is obvious one cannot use z to
both recover  a consistent  estimate  of  P  and to estimate  8  to test the exclusion  restriction  because
using only z both cannot be identified separately.  Therefore sufficient "exclusion  restrictions"(such as
8  = 0  ) must be imposed a priori and the 'just  identifying" assumptions  cannot be tested.28
Table 7:  Instrumental  variables eslimates  of the participation-performance  relationship,  using various  instrument sets
Estimation  OLS  'Extent  Part. a  * % of Invest-  'Net benefits  'Organization  based  on  Pnor  All
technique/  goalJ  ment  costs  by  of  local collectives'  commitment  of
Instrument set  users'  participation'  clients'  [  _
Bivariate
coeff  .63  .70  .59  .77  .74  .97  .86
(t stat)  (10.6)  (10.2)  (7.3)  (10.6)  (6.3)  (7.54)  (10.4)
N  120  120  113  120  98b  105  90
R-squared  .488  .482  .476  .453  *507h  .378  .521
First stage R-  - .763  .573  .701  .364  .326  .816
squareda  _  .
Limited Multivariato _
Coeff  .28  .34  .32  .36  .15  .39  .37
(t stat)  (5.25)  (5.2)  (3.6)  (5.4)  (1.28)  (3.00)  (3.57)
N  77  77  75  77  66  72  63
R-squared  .862  .860  .861  .858  .855  .863  .865
First stage  R-  [.401'1  .826  .643  .803  .719  .559  .857
squared' 
Notes:  a) Unadjusted  R-squared  of the 'first stage' regression  of participation  on the  instruments  (which  in the multivariate  case  includes  all variables  in
the performance  equation).
b)  Since  the sample  sizes are not the same  the results  are not strictly  comparable  in all columns.  In particular  the IV R-squared  are less than  OLS  R-
squared  when  run for tbe same  sample.
c)  This is tho R-squared  of participation  regressed  on all the Z variables  which  are included  in the perforrnance  equation. The increment  to the  R-
squared  for each  instrument  can  be calculated  as the difference  with this column.29
We believe  that "extent  to which  participation  was a goal' is the most plausibly
exogenous variable among individual instruments  as  there is  no  reason to  believe that
participation  as a goal should  by itself lead to better performance-ecept insofar  as it actually
raised participation. When  each of the other instruments  is tested, conditional  on the validity
of this variable (using a Hausman-Taylor  test), we fail to reject the exogeneity  of the other
instruments  in every case.  When the entire set of instruments  is tested, we do not reject the
validity of  the instrument set in either the bivariate or  multivariate  case".  Our set of
instruments  do stand  up to the available  tests for instrument  validity".
Timing
Evidence  on causality  also can be observed  from the timing  of the project  cycle.
If the association  between  participation  and project  performance  were not causal,  we would  see
no association  between  events  that occur before  -project  completion-proximate  detenninants  of
' The value  of the Sargan  test with  the full set of instruments  is 7.03 (significance  level .133)  in the
bivariate  and 5.24 (significance  level .263) in the multivariate  estimates.
19 Of course,  the major objection  to these  tests is that they  tend  to be of very low statistical  power
(that  is, these  tests will often  fail to reject  a hypothesis  that is false). Therefore  a "failure  to reject"  the
instruments  cannot  be taken as compelling  evidence  to accept  the instruments.30
project performance--and  beneficiary  participation. Table 8 reports  the impact  of participation
Table 8:  Impact  of beneficiary  participation  on the proximate
determinants of project performance
Bivariate  Limited  Full
multivariate  multivariate
Quality  of implementation  0.53  0.17  0.21
(9.3)  (2.7)  (2.7)
Effectiveness  of O&M  0.49  0.14  0.11
(7.4)  (2.0)  (1.1)
Maintenance  after 1 year  0.43  0.16  0.18
(6.6)  (2.0)  (1.8)
on  quality of  implementation, effectiveness of  operations and maintenance (O & M), and
maintenance  after 1 year.  We find that in all but one (multivariate)  case, beneficiary  is a
statistically  significant  input to these proximate  determinants. If project effectiveness  were
causing participation  rather than vice versa, we would  not expect  to see this result.
Case Studies
Studies of  individual cases help to  further resolve questions  of  causality,
particularly  when  exogenous  shifts in participation  change  project outcomes. Narayan  (1994)
documents  two such  case studies. Phase  I of the  Aguthi  Rural Water Supply  Project  in Kenya
was implemented  without  community  participation.  The project  was  so plagued  with  problems-
construction  delays, cost over-runs  and disagreements  over  consumer  payment  methods-that  it
camne  to a standstill. At this point, the project  was redesigned. The Aguthi  Water Committee,
working  with local leaders  and project  staff, mobilized  the community:  after  public stakeholder31
conferences,  community  members  organized  and began  contributing  to the project. Phase  II of
the project was completed  on schedule  and within budget;  the communities  continued  to pay
monthly  tariffs for the new water service, and operations  and maintenance  of the system  was
handled  successfully,  in cooperation  with the government  parastatal.
The WAS (Waniata,  Air dan Sanitasi)  program  in Indonesia  assisted  community
groups  to launch  and manage  their  own water system. A water group  in the village  of Silla  was
formed in 1986  as WAS  began. Initially, they relied heavily  on the arrival of a government
team to dig a bore hole, but none came.  When they realized that they could not rely on
immediate  government  assistance,  the members  increased  their participation. They  negotiated
water rights  with a neighboring  group, collected  building  material,  and built  firee water tanks-
with only a small  amount  of outside  assistance. By 1988  a new  well was under construction,
financed  by their own  contributions.  Eggplant  and chilies-with  water  from the new  tanks-were
flourishing  in peoples' yards.
Conclusion
We began  by showing  the existence  in project  level data of a strong  association
between  project performance  and beneficiary  participation. We then addressed  and answered
the three econometric  objections  to these results.  The subjectivity  of the data is not an
overwhelming  problem. The "halo effect" does not appear  to induce  a strong upward bias.
Most importantly,  there are strong arguments  that the participation  and project performance
relationship  is cause and effect. This paper, especially  together  with the more comprehensive
work of Narayan, 1994, does provide development  practitioners-including  early and recent32
converts  to the  participatory  approach-with  strong  statistical  findings  that  increasing  participation
directly  causes  better  project performance.
Three  questions  which  are important  for practice  and policy  are not explored  here. First,
does participation  directly  cause better project performance  across all sectors?  One cannot
blindly  extrapolate  the results  in this study  across all sectors,  since this data  is only from rural
water supply  projects. The economic  characteristics  of rural water as a good would seem  to
promote  the importance  of direct  beneficiary  participation;  these economic  characteristics  vary
across goods provided  by projects  in other sectors.  Second,  what policy instruments  help to
achieve more effective  participation? The behavior of project beneficiaries,  staff in project
agencies,  and other suppliers  responds  to incentives,  but there is little documented  experience
on creating  incentives  in public sector  agencies  for promoting  and incorporating  participation.
Finally,  can experiences  with  participation  help to clarify  the  analysis  of the deficiencies  inherent
in  either a  purely individualistic  'market" or  a  purely statist 'government' approach to
development?  An analytic  approach  that incorporates  participation  might  examine  the various
mechanisms whereby cooperative action by  groups can  overcome the  inefficiency of
individualistic solutions--e.g, from  'free  riding'  or  strategic (mis)revelation  of  private
information--while  avoiding the limitations  of  centralized  government.  These "informal'
methods  of cooperation  have been explored  by a number  of authors (Ostrom,  Schroeder  and
Wynne 1993,  DeSoto 1989,  Wade 1988)  but much remains  to be leamed.33
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Appendix Table 1.1:
Variable  Label  N  Mean  Std. Dev.
Performance Indicators
V24  Overall Project  121  4.09  1.6
Effectiveness
V90  Percentage of Water  98  4.8  1.8
System in Good Condition
V44  Objective Value of  120  4.2  1.3
Benefits
V33  Percentage of Target  118  4.9  1.1
Population Reached
Participation  Variable
V105  Overall Participation  121  3.7  1.7
(OBP)  I  I
Fully exogenous  perforznance  determinants (Z)
Vi  GNP/Capita  114  519.8  389.3
VS  Project Complexity  121  3.3  1.2
V47  Total Cost (LN)  104  15.4  1.5
V126  Adequacy of Facilities  121  4.5  1.3
V127  Difficulties in Staff  92  3.8  1.7
Recruiting
V94  Availability of Parts  115  4.2  1.5
V130  Objectives, Target  121  4.4  1.2
Other performance determinants (W)  _
V134  Appropriateness of  121  4.5  1.3
Technology
V66  Support of Govemment  118  4.6  1.1
V71  Agency Understanding  118  2.8  0.9
V61  Conduciveness  of Political  121  3.2  0.7
Context  :  .36
V62  Conduciveness  of  121  3.22  0.7
Econoniic  Context
V63  Conduciveness  of  121  3.5  0.7
Social/Cultural  Context
V64  Conduciveness  of  121  3.2  0.9
Geol/Environmental
Context
V72  Average  Number  of Users  117  3.2  1.1
V69  Competiion  From Other  109  3.4  1.5
Sources
V128  Skill of Staff  111  4.6  1.2
V129  Overal Quality  of  120  4.2  1.3
Management  _  - __  _37
Appendix Table 1.2: Full multivarlate regressions of project performance
BIN  ~MDh,o  behlv  of  PoI 4awb  What"
an  ul  U  min  . W  )  oilmuZ  aM  WhdubIYe
OBP  0.6  0.21  0.2
(VIOS)  (104  (5.3)  0.3)
AvaMilEly  or  PMs  0.57  0.44
('/94)  (9.0  (5.
Objeedm. Twas  0.22  0.54
(V'130)  (2X)  (0.4)
Admqmcy  of PacuWd  0.14  0.0
(V124)  (1.9)  (DA)
ONPiCaIIm  .0.003  -0.00006
(Vi)  (4.5  (4.3)
Pojed  Camplam (CV5)  -0.0  4.07
(-1.2  ()09-
DlI[culim  SUN  Recuiing  -0.05  0.006
(V127)  (.1.1)  (D.1)
Total  Cost  (la)  0.04  0.0
(V47)  (0.)  (1
Appropdatuus.  ofTechnlgy  0.19
(V134)  (2.3)
Ovewl Qay  of  dm  a  0.21
(V129)  (1.)
Suppou.fGovmmcs  0.10
Av_a  number  of Us.  .0.03
(V72)  (-1.06)
CoodwiamaofEcmwio  Comm  0.1
(V62)  (0.9)
Cosudvmaveorcabsmn.  CoSUI  -0.1
(V4)  (4.9)
Skh ofStaff  0.031
(VI28)  (0-  .
Agency  USderaSh  0.05
(V71)  (0'3)
Ccmlsivmr  of PoUl  Coaet  003
(V61)  (0.24)
Cmpcddn  rom  Odur Soves  -0.01
(V69)  (-)
Coaduiudeoof  S.clCuh.  Cotxa  0.02
(V63)  (0.1)
N  121  77  68
- _RI'  _  .49  .36  .9938
Appendix  Table 1.3:  Project  participation  "irzst stage" regressions
Full  v117  v55  v124  v116  v67
v117  .24  .682
(2.89)  (12.9)
v55  .07  .505
(.87)  (6.51)
v124  .248  .658
(3.06)  (11.8)
v116  .11  .44
(1.47)  (5.83)
v67  .044  .49
(.452)  (4.03)
Exogenous variables  in the  limited multivariate regression
vS  -.013  -.034  .158  .014  .068  .151
(.191)  (.431)  (1.40)  (.176)  (.73)  (1. 19)
v47  -.098  -.019  -.169  -.029  -.14  -.286
(1.73)  (.329)  (1.93)  (.474)  (1.99)  (2.86)
v126  .19  .181  .381  .223  .354  .382
(2.22)  (2.01)  (2.98)  (2.33)  (3.15)  (2.53)
v127  -.016  .041  .004  -.011  -.052  .009
(.323)  (.75)  (.051)  (.192)  (.783)  (.108)
v130  .144  .12  .142  .128  .187  .129
(1.88)  (1.36)  (1.09)  (1.38)  (1.82)  (.901)
v94  -.048  -.001  .009  -.086  .003  -.028
(.727)  (.016)  (.09)  (1.  1  1)  (.035)  (.238)
v 1  .00051  .00073  .00034  .00083  .00043  .00067
(2.68)  (3.51)  (1.12)  (3.76)  (1.76)  (1.98)
N  63  77-  75  77  66  72
R-squared  .865  .826  .643  .803  .719  .559
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